

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

13 MAR 1988

TO: VC/NIC (Mr. Gries)

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REMARKS:

FROM: Senior Review Panel

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WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC-00021-88
3 March 1988

Senior Review Panel

Bill
I agree this would make a good KJ. What do you think?
Dave

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Senior Review Panel Comments on Draft IIM:
Colombia: Counternarcotics Program:
Implications for the United States,
internally dated 12 February 1988

1. The Panel considers this an effective, well-organized, and generally well-written paper, albeit sobering and discouraging. It presents a convincing picture of the drug mafia's destructive use of violence against Colombia's social and political institutions. The five Box Texts should prove especially helpful. The draft makes clear the effective sabotaging of the counternarcotics program, the undermining of the will of the Colombian government, and the capacities of the mafia-like terrorists to stymie joint efforts by Washington and Bogota to deal with the drug problem. We have a few observations of a general nature.

2. A Missing Key Judgment. On the basis of the material presented, we believe there is a Key Judgment which must be made explicit; namely, Colombia's illegal narcotics trade and gangsterism, with the United States as the target, will increase drastically despite feeble attempts by the Barco government to stem the tide.

3. President Barco.

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LDA While Box 5 indicates the relative vacuum which could accompany his disappearance from the scene, we miss some reference to which institutions and personalities remain his supporters at this desperate moment. Although the draft states that Barco has not yet conceded in the war on drugs (page 5), it leaves the impression that he has suspended challenges to the "kingpins."

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Signers
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4. The Traffickers. Though this may be the result of inadequate intelligence, the reader misses some explanation of just who are the "major kingpins" referred to in the text. How extensive is their network; how are logistics handled; and how great are the numbers within the drug enterprise and their insurgent allies? Perhaps an illustrative example or two can assist in conveying the seriousness of the crisis. This should not be impossible since the draft states (page 7) that the drug mafia amounts to "almost a shadow government." The text also refers to "flagrant political manipulation by the traffickers."

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5. Dimensions. We miss in this draft indication of just how large the drug operation is in terms of dollars. There is frequent mention of bribery but no instances are cited. How much money is involved in the bribing of a high official? Who pays how much to whom? If Colombia is the major source of refined cocaine sent to the US, do we have an estimate of the number of billions of dollars involved? We miss specifics, even in Box 1. Are there a couple examples of intimidation or bribery which can help bring a sense of immediacy to this gruesome story?

6. Other Institutions. The policymaker will want at least some passing assessment of the role of traditional institutions on the Colombian scene. What is the position of the Church? Have the Church and its hierarchy been supportive, neutral, or opposed to the antinarcotics program? How do military leaders respond to the effort?

John B. McPherson
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cc: AC/NIC (Mr. Hutchinson)
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NIO for Narcotics

ODCI/SRP:thelma

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